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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Condition of Unseaworthiness Arising After the
Commencement of the Voyage.
Whether a seaman may recover compensatory damages for injuries
sustained by reason of a condition of unseaworthiness arising after the
commencement of the voyage is a question recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court.1 In Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc.,2 the
petitioner was a crew member on the respondent's vessel, which had
docked after returning from a fishing voyage and on that same day unloaded her cargo of fish spawn. As a result of the bags of spawn being
handed over the side rail of the ship, the rail became covered with a
slippery substance known as fish gurry. When the unloading was
complete, the petitioner prepared to go ashore. He stepped onto the
rail in order to reach a ladder on the pier, slipped and fell with resulting
injuries.
Suit was brought on the law side of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts,8 plaintiff asking for compensatory damages, as well as maintenance and cure, upon alternative theories: (1) The Jones Act4 for negligence, and (2) the unseaworthiness
of the vessel. The trial court charged that in order for the mariner to
be successful on either theory, the jury must find that the respondent
shipowner had actual or constructive notice of the condition of the railing on which the seaman slipped. The jury awarded maintenance and
cure but found for the shipowner on both counts of compensatory damages. 5
The petitioner appealed urging as error the district court's charge
that notice of the condition of unseaworthiness was required to make
the owner liable. The court of appeals, however, affirmed, holding

'-The question was discussed and deliberately left open in Dixon v. United

States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955)
362 U.S. 539 (1960)

' The suit was brought on the law side of the court on the basis of Doucette v.
Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952), which interpreted the jurisdictional provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1949) as allowing a complainant to bring his suit on the
law side of the court if his cause of action arose under the general maritime law.
This case was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in Romero v. Inter-

national Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).

The court of appeals,

however, dismissed Trawler Racer's objection to the jurisdiction of the lower
court by reason of the "pendant" doctrine which allows action on the law side
where two counts are contained in one complaint and one could have been brought
on the law side of the court.
'41
Stat. 1007 (1929), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
5
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 434 (D. Mass. 1958).
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that the rule of absolute liability for unseaworthiness depended upon
conditions existing at the commencement of the voyage.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a 6 to 3 decision
reversed both lower courts and remanded the case to the district court
for a new trial on the issue of unseaworthiness. Relying upon Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki' and Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson8 the Court
held that the duty to provide a seaworthy ship is present at all times,
and that it makes no difference whether the condition arises before or
after the commencement of the voyage or whether the condition be
permanent or temporary.9 The Court stated that the liability of a
shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship
is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to
other well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped
to meet the hazards which performing the service imposes, the
liability is neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character.... It is a form of absolute duty owing to
all within the range of its humanitarian policy.10
The. three dissenting members of the Court, led by Justice Frankfurter in an elaborate twenty-page opinion, said that the whole doctrine of unseaworthiness as it is applied to seamen is unfounded."1
Apparently the doctrine of unseaworthiness was first formulated 12
in 1816 by Lord Eldon in Douglas v. Scougall.13 In that case the insurer was sought to be held for the loss of the cargo, but the court held
that the owner must bear the responsibility for the unseaworthy condition of his ship which caused the loss when such condition existed
at the commencement of the voyage. The first English case involving
the doctrine in a personal injury situation was Couch v. Steel14 which
held that the doctrine did not apply in such a case. In 1876, twenty' Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (lst Cir. 1959). The court
said that none of the cases concerned a temporary condition of unseaworthiness
which had arisen without negligence during the voyage of a ship unquestionably
seaworthy at the outset.
'328 U.S. 85 (1946). The Court held that a shipowner was liable to a stevedore who was injured while working on board ship by the falling of a boom which
was caused by the faulty condition of a shackle.

The facts of this case were essentially the same as
8347 U.S. 396 (1954).
those in the Sieracki case supra note 7, and the decision rested upon the holding
thereof.
362 U.S. at 539.
1 362 U.S. at 549, quoting from Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85,
94-95 (1946).
11 The majority of the Court declined to re-examine the historical basis for the
doctrine. 362 U.S. at 550.

" "The ancient code imposed no duty upon the shipowner and master to take
pains to provide a staunch ship for the benefit of the mariners." Tetreault, Sea-'
men, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 Coaxzu L.Q. 381,
387 184
(1954).
Dow 269, 3 Eng. Rep. 1161 (1816).
1

3 El. & B. 402; 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1854).
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three years after Couch v. Steel, The Merchant Shipping Act' 5 was
enacted by Parliament, imposing the duty of due diligence upon the
shipowner to see that the vessel was .eaworthy at the inception of the
voyage and that the ship be maintained in a seaworthy condition during
the voyage. Following this act, the House of Lords in Hedley v. Pinkhzey & Sons S.S. Co. held that the failure to use available stanchions
and rails as a result of which a seaman was thrown overboard and
drowned did not render the vessel unseaworthy within the meaning
6
of the statute.'
The doctrine had a similar origin in the United States. In 1869 the
Supreme Court in The Northern Belle1 7 held that the shipowner's duty
to provide and maintain a seaworthy ship for the voyage was absolute
and that liability for cargo damage resulting from an unseaworthy vessel must be borne by the owner of that vessel and not his insurer.
Some earlier American cases dealing with seaman's injuries imposed liability on the shipowner to the extent that there was negligence
by the owner, master, or mate to provide proper equipment or to correct dangerous conditions aboard ship after reasonable notice of the
existence of such conditions.' 8 In another line of cases the mariner
was allowed recovery on the basis of "unseaworthiness," but the standard imposed by this doctrine at that time was no greater than due
diligence.' 9
The right of seamen to recover for injuries caused by unseaworthiness was first declared in The Osceolae° in 1903, where the Supreme
Court said that the duty of a shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship
for his crew is absolute.2 ' This statement was dictum, however, be"The Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 80, provides "that the
owner of the ship and the master, and every agent charged with the loading of the
ship, or the preparing thereof for sea, or the sending thereof to sea, shall use all
reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage at the
time when the voyage commences, and to keep her in a seaworthy condition for
the voyage during the same."
Is [1894] A.C. 222 (Scot.). The House of Lords in fact held that the failure
to use this equipment, while not resulting in unseaworthiness, did constitute negligence on the part of those in charge of the management of the vessel but that
under the fellow servant rule no cause of action existed against the owner by
reason of the master's negligence.
1176 U.S. (9 Wall.) 526 (1869).
"The Julia Fowler, 49 Fed. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1892) ; The Frank and Willie, 45
Fed. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592 (C.C.D. Mass. 1890);
Olson v. Flavel, 34 Fed. 477 (D. Ore. 1888); The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. 855
(D. Ore. 1886) ; The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1885) ; Halverson v.
Nisen, 11 Fed. Cas. 310 (No. 5970) (D. Cal. 1876); Brown v. The D. S. Cage,
4 Fed. Cas. 367 (No. 2002) (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1872).
"The Robert C. McQuillen, 91 Fed. 685 (D. Conn. 1899) ; The Lizzie Frank,
31 Fed. 477 (S.D. Ala. 1887).
2- 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
21 The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (No. 3930) (D. Pa. 1789), appears to be the
first American-case to require the-shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel for
his crew. It should be noted, however, that a breach of the obligation. merely
permitted the seaman to leaVe the ship's service without forfeiture of wages or
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cause the holding was that no recovery could be had for mere operating negligence, i.e., an improvident order given by the master. This
dictum was not followed in a subsequent lower court decision in 1905.22
In 1922, however, the Supreme Court gave new life to the dictum of
The Osceola by its opinion in Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger23
where it was stated obiter that a seaman may recover for injuries sustained through the unseaworthy condition of the ship. Thus dictum
was compounded with dictum and so stood the law of unseaworthiness
until 1944, when the Supreme Court decided Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co.24 In that case there is a clear holding that the owner's duty to
provide a seaworthy ship does not depend upon negligence. 2
More recently the doctrine of unseaworthiness has been held to
embrace more than mere physical defectiveness of the ship or equipment. In Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. 28 a seaman was assaulted
by a man of a savage and vicious nature, a man whose very presence
on board ship rendered it a perilous place. The victim was allowed to
recover from the shipowner on the ground that the ship was unseaworthy because of the presence of the vicious attacker.
The underlying premise in the Boudoin case was that the vicious
seaman was of that nature from the beginning of the voyage. If it be
assumed that the assailant had developed his propensity for vicious conduct after the voyage had begun, then the question arises under the
Mitchell decision whether the shipowner would be liable to the victim
for unseaworthiness. The holding itself in the principal case would
seem to require an affirmative answer,27 yet there is language in the
Court's opinion to suggest that the owner would not be held liable in
the freak accident situation.,28
being subject to prosecution for desertion.

"As late as 1832, Circuit Judge Story

viewed the obligation of the vessel and shipowner to a mariner injured in its
service as limited to maintenance and cure, with the possible exception of the
unusual case where the mariner might have received his injuries in defending
the vessel against some extraordinary peril." Tetreault, supra note 12, at 384.
"The Henry B. Fiske, 141 Fed. 188 (D. Mass. 1905).
23259 U.S. 255 (1922).
2'321 U.S. 96 (1944).
2 In the Mahnich case a seaman was injured while at sea by falling from a
staging which gave way when a piece of defective rope supporting the staging
broke. The Court in a 7 to 2 decision (Justices Frankfurter and Roberts dissenting) allowed the seaman to recover on the doctrine of unseaworthiness and this
despite the fact that a sound rope was on board.
28348 U.S. 336 (1955), 33 TExAs L. REv. 1081.
" The-Court held that a shipowner is liable for injuries suffered 'by a seaman
through the unseaworthy condition which arose after the commencement of. the
voyage.
" "What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish
an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a
vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is
not -perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every peril of
the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service." 362 U.S. at
550.
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While the Court's statement was perhaps intended to provide the
Court some escape from holding against the shipowner in every injury
case remotely connected with either the ship or its personnel, it remains open to some doubt how far the holding in Mitchell will be taken
to impose its newly found- duty of the shipowner to provide a seaworthy
ship at all times. To use another example, a ship at sea encounters a
severe storm the force of which weakens the mast, thereby rendering
the ship unseaworthy. Subsequently while the ship is limping into
port where she can be repaired, the mast topples, striking and injuring
a seaman. If the shipowner incurs liability in such a case, it is difficult
to see how his duty to provide the requisite seaworthy ship can be
fulfilled while his ship is yet at sea and beyond the reach of harbor
repair facilities.
The dissent in Mitchell took the view that the Court's decision virtually made the shipowner an insurer of the seaman, whereas the doctrine of unseaworthiness originated in both English and American
courts as a means of protecting marine cargo insurance carriers from
undue risks.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion is the sounder, for it
recognizes that the doctrine of unseaworthiness was called into existence for one reason-the encouragement of marine insurance. It also
recognizes that the doctrine has undergone its expansion since that time
through some dubious judicial precedent. And with the decision in
the principal case it is seen that perhaps the last vestige of the historical doctrine of unseaworthiness has been cast off-that element which
required the shipowner to make his ship safe for the impending voyage while the ship is yet in port. The shipowner is now liable without
fault before,2 9 during,3 0 and after 31 the voyage to a seaman (or one
doing a seaman's work) injured aboard his ship.
HOWARD A. KNOX, JR.
Domestic Relations-Basis of the Award of Alimony Pendente
Lite in North Carolina.
Alimony pendente lite may be awarded to any married woman upon her application to the court with notice to her husband during any
proceeding for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and board, or alimony without divorce. 1 She may receive the award whether she be
the plaintiff or the defendant in the principal action.2 If the wife is
328 U.S. 85 (1946).
Co. v. Sieracki,
"Seas Shipping
v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
IoMahnich
"Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 50-15 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5046 (Supp. 1959).
'Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E2d 109 (1953) ; Medlin v. Medlin,
175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918) ; Webber v. Webber, 79 N.C. 572 (1878).

